On Pakistan and Clarke

Among Condoleezza Rice’s opening remarks are several mentions of Pakistan’s support of the Taliban and efforts to neutralize it: More importantly, we recognized that no counterterrorism strategy could succeed in isolation. As you know from the Pakistan and Afghanistan strategy documents that we made available to the Commission, our counterterrorism strategy was part of a … Continue reading “On Pakistan and Clarke”

Among Condoleezza Rice’s opening remarks are several mentions of Pakistan’s support of the Taliban and efforts to neutralize it:

More importantly, we recognized that no counterterrorism strategy could succeed in isolation. As you know from the Pakistan and Afghanistan strategy documents that we made available to the Commission, our counterterrorism strategy was part of a broader package of strategies that addressed the complexities of the region.

Integrating our counterterrorism and regional strategies was the most difficult and the most important aspect of the new strategy to get right. Al-Qaida was both client of and patron to the Taliban, which in turn was supported by Pakistan. Those relationships provided al-Qaida with a powerful umbrella of protection, and we had to sever them. This was not easy.

Not that we hadn’t tried. Within a month of taking office, President Bush sent a strong, private message to President Musharraf urging him to use his influence with the Taliban to bring Bin Laden to justice and to close down al-Qaida training camps. Secretary Powell actively urged the Pakistanis, including Musharraf himself, to abandon support for the Taliban. I met with Pakistan’s Foreign Minister in my office in June of 2001. I delivered a very tough message, which was met with a rote, expressionless response.

America’s al-Qaida policy wasn’t working because our Afghanistan policy wasn’t working. And our Afghanistan policy wasn’t working because our Pakistan policy wasn’t working. We recognized that America’s counterterrorism policy had to be connected to our regional strategies and to our overall foreign policy.

To address these problems, I made sure to involve key regional experts. I brought in Zalmay Khalilzad, an expert on Afghanistan who, as a senior diplomat in the 1980s, had worked closely with the Afghan Mujahedeen, helping them to turn back the Soviet invasion. I also ensured the participation of the NSC experts on South Asia, as well as the Secretary of State and his regional specialists. Together, we developed a new strategic approach to Afghanistan. Instead of the intense focus on the Northern Alliance, we emphasized the importance of the south ? the social and political heartland of the country. Our new approach to Pakistan combined the use of carrots and sticks to persuade Pakistan to drop its support for the Taliban. And we began to change our approach to India, to preserve stability on the subcontinent.

This is about as clued-in as it gets. The overall opening statement is a knock-out blow to Dick Clarke’s claims of Bush Administration laxity. I’m not convinced that Clarke was actually lying, however, as much as he was out-of-the-loop as a mid-level holdover from the Clinton Administration whose grasp of the overall terrorism plan was limited by his need to know. Clarke’s role in the White House wasn’t even as large as he thought it was, let alone as large as he wished it were. So even if Clarke’s criticisms were perfectly valid from his point of view, his knowledge of the overall plan was extremely limited.